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Do Stock Markets Play a Role in Determining COVID-19 Economic Stimulus? 
A Cross-Country Analysis
Abstract
This paper makes an innovative contribution to the extant literature by analyzing the determinants of 
economic stimulus packages implemented by governments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
In particular, we explore whether stock market declines observed in many countries can predict the 
size of COVID-19 stimulus packages. Moreover, we explore whether a country’s level of income can 
augment the underlying relationship between stock market declines and stimulus packages. The 
findings reveal that a larger stock market decline results in a larger stimulus package; however, this 
effect is only observed in countries that have an income level greater than the mean and/or median per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP). Moreover, our results show that monetary policy is more 
responsive to a stock market decline than fiscal policy. Thus, our results underscore the importance of 
international donor agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
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1 Introduction
Since mid-February 2020, the spread of COVID-19 rattled economic prospects and financial 
markets globally (Espitia et al., 2021). The best economic outcome is likely to be a recession as 
deep as the economic outcome of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-09. Following this, 
authorities worldwide spent an unprecedented amount of taxpayer money to bail out financial 
institutions with the aim of protecting the financial system. In response to the COVID-19, 
authorities are once again bailing out businesses, but the present bailout has a very different root 
cause than that of the GFC. The GFC was rooted in an overleveraged banking system that was 
overexposed to an also highly leveraged housing sector. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused 
widespread disruption to trade, with some businesses only operating at a fraction of their 
capability. Furthermore, economic agents are restraining economic activity and waiting to observe 
how the situation unfolds before making economic decisions. These behaviors cause an immediate 
shock to the economy on both the demand and supply sides. Since, as a result, many businesses 
are temporarily closed and workers are furloughed, governments must bail out businesses to 
ensure they will be able to resume activity after lockdowns are lifted. 
Governments worldwide have implemented a number of measures to contain the spread of 
COVID-19 and ensure healthcare systems are able to cope (Hoekman et al., 2021). These include 
school and workplace closures, citywide and even nationwide lockdowns, and travel restrictions 
(Atkeson, 2020). These measures have proven effective across the world—the infection rate is 
declining, with most developed countries appearing to have passed the peak. Nevertheless, 
restrictions have far-reaching economic implications. Stock markets reacted to this environment, 
crashing across the globe as the future depressed earnings of companies were incorporated into 
forecasts. The link between the stock market and the economy has been well-established (Friend, 
1972; Levine, 2005; Levine & Zervos, 1998); however, the determinants of economic stimulus 
packages implemented in response to the COVID-19 crisis remains largely unanswered. 
The economic stimulus packages implemented by governments worldwide are a 
combination of fiscal, monetary, and financial policy measures. Fiscal measures include paying 
furloughed employees’ salaries and sick leaves, providing financial support for small and large 
businesses, government and the central banks financing facilities, and directly funding healthcare 
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rate cuts (Beck, 2020). Other financial policy measures include guidance for banks and insurance 
companies on dividends and share buybacks (Shen, 2020).
We examine whether the stock market is a leading indicator of a country’s stimulus package. 
This topic has been widely researched under the finance-growth nexus (Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 
2000; Levine, 2005; Levine & Zervos, 1998), providing both theoretical and empirical evidence 
that financial markets boost economic growth. However, whether financial markets can predict an 
economic stimulus package in response to a crisis has never been studied to the best of our 
knowledge. The extent of a stock market decline indicates how investors view an economy’s 
potential future performance. We, therefore, hypothesize that the greater the decline in a country’s 
stock market index, the higher the economic stimulus package will be. Our study is motivated by 
the initial work of Elgin, Basbug, and Yalaman (2020), but we add several important determining 
factors to their model. Furthermore, we decompose economic stimulus packages (the CESI index) 
into their constituent monetary and fiscal components as well as the balance of 
payments/exchange rate measures. Earlier studies have highlighted the importance of stock market 
changes and the responsiveness of monetary authorities in adjusting interest rates (Bernanke & 
Gertler, 1989, 2000; Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1998). We found that a larger stock market 
decline leads to a larger economic stimulus package. However, this effect is only observed in 
developed and high-income countries with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) greater than 
the median GDP per capita. This indicates that, in making their decisions, authorities should 
examine the stock markets of developed and high-income countries more closely, perhaps due to 
the presence of more well-developed financial markets. Moreover, we discover that authorities 
respond more aggressively to a stock market decline with monetary than fiscal policy. This 
indicates how important international donor agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF are in 
supporting less affluent countries in coping with the adverse impacts of COVID-19.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following important ways. First, we 
address monetary and fiscal policy responses to changes in asset prices, exploring the finance-
growth nexus in the wake of COVID-19. Specifically, we study the responsiveness of the COVID-
19 Economic Stimulus Index (CESI) to stock market declines. Second, we exploit recent volatility 
in stock market prices and examine whether monetary policy is more responsive compared to 
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methodology since we apply quantile regression in addition to ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature, Section 3 
derives the model applied for estimation and explains the data and empirical methodologies used, 
Section 4 presents results and relevant discussion, and finally, Section 5 provides concluding 
comments and policy implications.
2 Literature Review
The economic disruption caused by COVID-19 is unprecedented. To limit the spread of the 
disease, many countries resorted to complete or partial lockdowns of their economies. This 
adversely affected economic activity, leading to significant downward revisions of growth 
projections previously made by the IMF and others. The pandemic also resulted in significant 
global stock market volatility. For instance, volatility in US stock markets rivaled or surpassed 
those observed during the 2008-09 GFC or the October 1987 Black Monday crisis (Baker et al., 
2020).
To mitigate the adverse impact of lockdown, governments introduced measures and relief 
packages including fiscal, monetary, and financial policy measures (Elgin et al., 2020). Using data 
from 166 countries, Elgin et al. created a measure that captured policy responses. Their results 
indicate responses are significantly associated with GDP per capita, median population age, 
number of hospital beds, and total COVID-19 cases. Similarly, Balajee, Tomar, and Udupa (2020) 
explored the impact of sovereign credit rating on fiscal responses. Their findings revealed 
countries with lower credit ratings are likely to provide lower fiscal stimulus. Moreover, countries 
with lower credit ratings tend to delay implementing fiscal stimulus.
Fukuda and Yamada (2011) explored the response of fiscal stimulus packages to “stock 
price targeting” in Japan. Their findings indicated targeting can reasonably predict Japan’s fiscal 
expenditures and, in the absence of stock price targeting, the biannual fiscal stimulus in Japan 
would have been 2.5 trillion yen lower, on average, from 1992 to 2000. Tagkalakis (2012) 
investigated the relationship between volatility of different asset prices and volatility of fiscal 
policy. The findings provide evidence that an increase in asset price volatility also increases fiscal 
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increases volatility in government revenues and spending (Tagkalakis, 2012). Moreover, trade 
openness results in larger variations in government revenue, government expenditures, and 
primary balance-to-GDP ratios. This is in line with the findings of Rodrik (1998), which suggested 
that to provide increased social insurance and reduce economic instability arising from a greater 
level of integration, countries more open to trade tend to have larger governments. Similarly, 
Kneller (2007) provided evidence that social insurance welfare spending is primarily affected by 
trade liberalization.
Few studies have explored the response of monetary policy to asset price volatility. Rigobon 
and Sack (2003) explored the magnitude of the US Federal Reserve’s reaction. Their finding 
revealed that a rise (fall) in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index increased the likelihood of a 
tightening (easing) of US monetary policy. Similar findings were reported by Bjørnland and 
Leitemo (2009), indicating that a shock to the stock market that increased real stock prices by 1% 
resulted in an approximately four basis point increase in the interest rate. Earlier work by 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 2000) and Bernanke et al. (1998) also highlighted central bank 
responses to turmoil and asset price shocks, especially the stock market.
3 Model, Data, and Methodology
Our models are motivated by Elgin et al. (2020), who constructed the CESI, using principal 
component analysis (PCA), from seven policy variables measuring fiscal policy, monetary policy, 
and balance of payments/exchange rate policy. The source of these policy variables is the IMF’s 
COVID-19 Policy Tracker, 2020.1 We specify a baseline model (1), in which the CESI is a 
function of a stock market fall and its interaction with the log of real GDP per capita, budget 
balance, log of the median age of the population, log of hospital beds per capita, and infection rate:
𝐶𝐸𝑆𝐼
= 𝛽1(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑙 × ln 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝛽2
(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑒 × ln 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑙) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑒) + 𝛽5(
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽6(ln 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽7(ln 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑠) + 𝛽8(
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽9(ln 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝜀
(1)
1 We used the fifth update (May 07, 2020) of the CESI by Elgin et al. (2020) to ensure that we were able to capture all 
economic stimulus packages that were offered since countries adopted strict public health measures such as 
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Here, stock fall is a dummy variable that represents a fall in the main stock market index of a 
particular economy in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic—the beginning of 2020 to the first 
week of April—by more than one standard deviation (S.D.) (see Table 1 for S.D. of stock market 
change). It is defined below:
(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑙) = {1, 𝑖𝑓 (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) < ―1 𝑆.𝐷.0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 (2)
Data are obtained from various online sources, including Bloomberg and the respective 
country stock exchange websites. For some African countries for which stock market indices were 
unavailable, we used Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM) and S&P Africa 40 
index. The BRVM is a regional stock exchange index serving west African countries, whereas the 
S&P Africa 40 index is comprised of the 40 largest and most liquid companies operating in Africa. 
Similarly, we used the S&P Latin America 40 index for some Latin American countries for which 
stock market indices were unavailable. Like stock fall, stock rise is a dummy variable that 
measures a stock market change of more than one S.D. It is defined as:
(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑒) = {1, 𝑖𝑓 (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) > +1 𝑆.𝐷.0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 (3)
This approach to measuring changes beyond a particular threshold (such as one S.D.) is 
intuitive because we are interested in identifying substantial stock market falls attributable to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, overlooking day-to-day fluctuations. This approach has been widely used in 
the economics and finance literature, including in work by de Groot, Linders, and Rietveld (2005), 
Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010), and Kim, Shamsuddin, and Lim (2011).
We also incorporate interaction terms between the dummies, measuring stock market rises 
and falls beyond ±1 S.D. and the natural log of real GDP per capita. The intuition behind this is 
that how a government responds to stock market fluctuations depends on what it can afford and 
the economy’s level of development prior to the pandemic. Interaction between the stock market 
and economic development has been widely used in the literature, including by Lyócsa (2014), 
Guo (2015), Pradhan, Arvin, and Ghoshray (2015). A more developed and/or higher-income 
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economy is also expected to have a more developed and robust stock market, so a substantial fall 
is expected to trigger a government response. 
Real per capita GDP, obtained from Elgin et al. (2020), is expressed in thousands of 2010 
US dollars (US$) and accounts for the economy’s level of development. Real GDP per capita is 
expected to positively affect the CESI.
Budget balance controls a country’s fiscal standing prior to the pandemic. We used the 
IMF’s Fiscal Monitor Database’s (October 2019 update) forecasted 2020 budget balances. We 
took this approach because the particular economy’s fiscal standing prior to the pandemic should 
greatly determine its ability to mobilize economic stimulus in the wake of the pandemic. 
The median age of a country’s population is included since a higher-aged median voter is 
often expected to demand a larger stimulus package as well as welfare program (Bongaarts, 2004; 
Hollanders & Koster, 2011). The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the elderly demographic 
particularly hard—with the vast majority of fatalities and serious illnesses following infection 
prevalent in the 60 years and above demographic (Ausubel, 2020; World Health Organization, 
2020). This, in turn, is expected to strengthen demand for improved healthcare, income support, 
aged care, etc. However, an older population of voters is also prone to more conservative 
ideologies, including reduced government involvement in the economy, less transfer payments, 
bailouts etc. (Glenn, 1974; Peterson, Smith, & Hibbing, 2020). As a result, the effect of the log of 
the median age on the COVID-19 economic stimulus package is ambiguous a priori.
We incorporate the log of the number of hospital beds per capita, which accounts for the 
capacity of the hospital system to cope with increased patient numbers during the pandemic. The 
greater the capacity to deal with increased patient numbers, the lower the likelihood is of a large 
stimulus package (Elgin et al., 2020). Infection rate measures the ratio of total positive cases to the 
population and is a proxy for the spread of the COVID-19 in the country in question. A high 
infection rate is expected to put more residents out of work, lower productivity, and burden the 
healthcare system, which, in turn, will shrink the economy. An impending recession—or one that 
is already entrenched—is expected to motivate a government to implement a big stimulus 
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In line with Elgin et al. (2020), the baseline model (1) is gradually augmented (one by one) 
with additional regressors such as the stringency index, the log of the total number of cases in the 
country, healthcare expenditures, real GDP growth rate, and the world uncertainty index for 
individual countries. This was done to determine the correct model specification and ensure that it 
adequately captures the prevailing state of the economy and other public health measures adopted 
by the particular economy, as well as avoid any omitted variable biases. The stringency index 
captures strict public health measures—such as restrictions on domestic movement, social 
gatherings, operation of businesses and factories, and international travel—undertaken by the 
government in the wake of the pandemic’s onset. The stricter the public health measures, the more 
likely a larger stimulus to kickstart the economy once the restrictions are lifted. Data on the 
stringency index are sourced from the Elgin et al. (2020) dataset.
The total number of cases is a way to measure the size of the pandemic in a particular 
country. The higher the total number of cases, the more likely the government is to initiate a large 
stimulus package to overcome the decline in productivity and/or the loss of life. We take a log 
transformation of total cases to represent its diminishing marginal effect on the CESI.
Healthcare expenditure is measured as a percentage of GDP and accounts for the capability, 
sophistication, and robustness of the domestic healthcare system. The higher this is, the better 
equipped the system is to cope with COVID-19. In addition, higher healthcare expenditure is 
associated with welfare states that would be more inclined to offer larger stimulus packages to 
revitalize the economy (Castles, 2009). As such, the sign of the effect of healthcare expenditure on 
the CESI is ambiguous a priori, so the estimate will depend on the priorities of the relevant 
government and society—i.e., “cash versus services” (Bambra, 2005).
Lastly, other macroeconomic variables are added to the baseline model (1). GDP growth rate 
was forecast prior to the onset of the pandemic by the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (October 
2019 update). The intuition regarding the choice of this forecast (of real GDP growth rate) is the 
same as that of the budget balance. If an economy was expected to grow faster prior to the 
pandemic, the government would be more willing and able to afford a larger stimulus package 
(CESI). The world uncertainty index used for each country was obtained from the work of Ahir, 
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country risk/uncertainty, even before the pandemic, is expected to reduce the government’s 
economic stimulus package (Auerbach & Hassett, 2002; Hollmayr & Matthes, 2015).
The fully specified model can be expressed as Equation (4):
𝐶𝐸𝑆𝐼
= 𝛽1(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑙 × ln 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝛽2
(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑒 × ln 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑙) + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑒) + 𝛽5(
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽6(ln 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽7(ln 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑠) + 𝛽8(
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽9(ln 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝛽10(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + 𝛽11(
ln𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽12(𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽13(𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)
+ 𝛽14(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + 𝜀
(4)
These models (1 & 4) were estimated using the OLS. They were also estimated without an 
intercept to avoid the dummy variable trap between the full set of stock fall and rise dummies and 
the intercept term. The list of countries included can be found in Table A1 in Appendix A. To 
verify the validity of the results, we perform diagnostic tests such as the Wald test for the joint 
significance of regressor coefficients (i.e., the F-test) as well as the Breusch and Pagan (1979)-
Godfrey (1978) test for heteroskedasticity.
OLS estimates the coefficients in the conditional mean. However, it overlooks the 
distributional aspect of the estimated relationship. For a particular coefficient, half of the 
observations may yield higher values, while the other half may yield lower values (Koenker & 
Hallock, 2001). In other words, the model might exhibit a differing relationship between the 
regressors and regressands for different percentiles of the dataset. A quantile regression can be 
applied to capture distributional intricacies.2
4 Empirical Results
Table 1 provides summary statistics, divided using IMF’s income classifications. The total 
number of observations of the variables ranges between 92 (world uncertainty index) to 113 
(CESI, stock fall & rise, stock market change, and budget balance). Preliminary evidence from the 
unconditional means suggests economic stimulus packages provided by high-income countries 
are, on average, larger than those introduced by low-income, lower-middle-income, and upper-
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middle-income countries; yet all three country groups experienced a similar stock market decline, 
with averages ranging from -31.6% to -32.7%.
Total COVID-19 cases and infection rates are, on average, higher in high-income countries 
despite having a larger share of their GDPs dedicated to healthcare expenditures and a higher 
number of hospital beds per 1000 people. The median age is almost 17 years higher in high-
income countries than low- and lower-middle-income countries, whereas the median age in upper-
middle-income countries is approximately nine years higher than that in low- and lower-middle-
income countries.
In terms of economic variables, the average GDP per capita for high-income countries is 
approximately three times higher than that for upper-middle-income countries and almost 24 times 
higher than low-income and lower-middle-income countries. Real GDP growth for high-income 
countries is expected to be -5.1% compared to -3.8% for upper-middle-income countries and -
0.5% for low-income and lower-middle-income countries. Lastly, in all three income groups, more 
than 80 % of countries experienced a fall in stock prices, greater than one S.D. of the stock market 
change variable. In high-income countries, 93.8% of countries experienced a decline in the stock 
market that was greater than one S.D. of the stock market change variable.
Table 2 provides the OLS estimates. Column (1) reports estimated coefficients and standard 
errors from Model (1). The coefficients on the stock fall × log of real GDP per capita interaction 
term, budget balance, infection rate, and log of real GDP per capita are all positive, while those of 
the stock rise × log of real GDP per capita interaction term, stock fall, as well as the logs of 
median age and hospital beds are negative. However, only those of the stock fall × log of real GDP 
per capita interaction term and infection rate, and the stock rise × log of real GDP per capita 
interaction term and stock fall are significant. The stock rise dummy could not be included in the 
regressions due to near-perfect multicollinearity with the stock fall dummy.
The marginal effect of a stock market fall beyond –1 S.D. can be calculated using the 
following formula:
𝛽1 × (ln 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝛽3 (5)
For example, if we consider Column (1) of Table 2, the marginal effect of stock fall will be 
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capita is an important determinant of whether the marginal effect was positive or negative. For 
Model (1) estimates in Column (1), the marginal effect of a stock market fall is positive for both 
the mean (8.7) and the median (8.7) of the log of GDP per capita (see Figure 1.a). Thus, on 
average, a fall in the stock market beyond –1 S.D. results in governments of economies with real 
per capita incomes roughly US$6,100 or higher embarking on a larger stimulus package. A similar 
stimulus impact of the infection rate can also be observed. Looking at the interaction term of the 
stock rise and the log of real GDP per capita, the marginal effect is always negative as the stock 
rise dummy is absent due to multicollinearity (implicit restriction of its zero effect on the CESI). A 
stock market rise beyond +1 S.D., thus, is found to reduce the government’s economic stimulus 
response. These findings conform to the a priori expectations regarding their respective 
associations with the CESI. The adjusted R-squared value demonstrates that 48% of the variations 
in the CESI can be explained by the Model (1) estimates.
In Column (2), estimates from augmenting Equation (1) with the stringency index can be 
found. The positive coefficients on the stock fall × log of real GDP per capita interaction term and 
budget balance are statistically significant and that of the stock rise × log of real GDP per capita 
interaction term and stock fall negative and significant. The marginal effect of a stock market fall, 
computed using the mean and the median of the log of real GDP per capita, are now negative, with 
values of -0.4 and -0.5, respectively (see Figure 1.b). However, these relatively low magnitudes 
indicate that as per capita income moves further above the mean and median, the marginal effect 
becomes positive. Thus, at a higher level of development, a stock market crash still increases the 
size of the economic stimulus. The marginal effect of a stock market rise is again negative and an 
improvement in the budget balance positive. The explanatory power (adjusted R-squared value) 
improves slightly to 0.68. However, we lose more than half the observations when the stringency 
index is added. As a result, we follow Elgin et al. (2020) and proceed with estimating Model (1) 
without the stringency index. This also accommodates for any biases that might arise in the 
estimates due to small samples.
Model (1) is further augmented with the log of the total number of COVID-19 infections 
(log of total cases) and results reported in Column (3) of Table 2. The coefficients on the stock fall 
× log of real GDP per capita and stock rise × log of real GDP per capita interaction terms, as well 
as that of a stock fall, increase in value. The marginal effect is now positive at the mean and 
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found to reduce the CESI. The log of total cases increases the COVID-19 stimulus, which comes 
as no surprise. The explanatory power of the estimated model is now 50% of the variations in the 
CESI. The number of observations in Column (3) is on par with that of Column (1), Table 2.
Columns (4) to (6) further augment the specification with healthcare expenditure, real GDP 
growth rate, and world uncertainty index. Column (6) exhibits the full stimulus Model (4) without 
including the stringency index. The coefficients of the stock fall × log of real GDP per capita and 
stock rise × log of real GDP per capita interaction terms, as well as that of stock fall, decline in 
value slightly relative to their counterparts in Column (3). The marginal effects at the mean and 
median are negative but small in magnitude compared to Column (2) in all three specifications of 
Columns (4) to (6). As with Column (2), the marginal effects quickly become positive, with per 
capita income rising above the mean and median (see Figure 1.d to 1.f). Thus, we find robust 
evidence that, at higher-than-average levels of development/income, a stock market fall will 
motivate a government to increase the COVID-19 stimulus package.
In Column (6), we also find the log of median age to have a negative impact on the CESI. 
This is likely due to older voters favoring conservative economic policies (Glenn, 1974; Peterson 
et al., 2020). Moreover, the estimated results indicate healthcare expenditure and real GDP growth 
rate forecast prior to the pandemic are likely to increase the COVID-19 economic stimulus. The 
positive impact healthcare expenditure has on the CESI is reflective of the welfare considerations 
by the government when preparing the stimulus package as well as the preference for cash over 
services on average (Bambra, 2005; Castles, 2009).
The adjusted R-squared values improve slightly to 0.50, 0.51, and 0.52, respectively, up 
from 0.50 in Column (3). The number of countries included in Columns (4) and (5) are about the 
same as Column (3), but in Column (6), it is substantially lower at 78. The vital statistics for all six 
estimated models in Columns (1) to (6) pass the F- and homoskedasticity tests at the 1% and 5% 
levels of significance, respectively. As a result, the estimated findings from these specifications 
are consistent and efficient, so inferences made from them are valid and reliable.
As an added validation of our approach, we modified Equation (4) by removing the stock 
fall and rise dummies as well as their interaction terms with the log of real GDP per capita and 
replaced them with two variables: stock market change and its interaction term with the log of real 
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overcounting the impact of a stock market change on the stimulus. The re-specified model can be 
represented by Equation (6), which does not include the stringency index to avoid the loss of more 
than half of the sample.3
𝐶𝐸𝑆𝐼
= 𝛽1(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 × ln 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)
+ 𝛽3(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽4(ln 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 𝛽5(ln 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑠) + 𝛽6(
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽7(ln 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) + 𝛽8(ln 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽9(
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝛽10(𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽11(
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + 𝜀
(6)
The estimated results can be found in Column (7) of Table 2. The coefficient of stock market 
change is positive and significant, while that of its interaction term with the log of real GDP per 
capita is negative but insignificant. The latter may be due to the asymmetrical interaction that 
stock market falls and rises have with the level of development in determining the COVID-19 
stimulus. Overall, the marginal effect of a stock market change is positive—at and below the mean 
and median values of the log of real GDP per capita (see Figure 1.g)—in this specification, 
indicating an improvement in the stock market in the wake of the pandemic encourages larger 
government stimulus packages. This finding is counterintuitive. The explanatory power of the 
estimated Equation (6) is substantially lower, at 42.7%, compared to its counterpart in Column (6) 
(Table 2). However, Equation (6) passes the tests for homoskedasticity and joint significance of its 
coefficients at the usual levels of significance. Nevertheless, Equation (6) estimates indicate that it 
fails to capture the asymmetries and intricacies of stock market falls and rises and their interaction 
with the level of development (i.e., the log of real GDP per capita), thus, validating our approach.
Table 3 provides the results from substituting each of the seven components of the CESI as 
the dependent variable in Equation (4). The coefficients on the stock fall × log of real GDP per 
capita interaction term, as well as stock fall, are significant only in Column (3). The marginal 
effect of a stock fall on the reserve requirement and buffer—a monetary policy instrument—is 
positive at both the mean and median values of the log of GDP per capita, indicating that a stock 
fall is effective at encouraging expansionary monetary policy. In Column (5), the stock rise × log 
of real GDP per capita interaction term is negative and significant, demonstrating that a stock rise 
discourages government from other types of expansionary monetary policy. The stock market is 
more effective in influencing monetary policy than fiscal or balance of payments measures 
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because monetary policy is often highly responsive to movements in the stock market and vice 
versa (Basistha & Kurov, 2008; Rigobon & Sack, 2003). An interest rate cut is an effective and 
relatively easy expansionary monetary policy instrument, and stock market returns have been 
documented as responding considerably and swiftly to it ex post facto (Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; 
Bjørnland & Leitemo, 2009; Thorbecke, 1997). In contrast, an expansionary fiscal policy involves 
aggravating the debt burden of the government, while balance of payments measures involve time-
consuming and costly modifications to trade and exchange rate policies that can adversely affect 
the importation of vital medical and essential supplies (Evenett et al., 2021).
The log of median age is found to reduce fiscal policy packages (Column 1) but improve 
other monetary expansions (Column 5). This indicates that higher median age is associated with 
conservative economic policies that prefer monetary expansion over fiscal stimulus, bailouts, 
transfer payments, etc. The infection rate appears to increase fiscal packages (Column 1) but 
worsens other balance of payments measures (Column 7). An increase in the infection rate renders 
many in the labor force unproductive, requiring more substantial fiscal stimulus, bailouts, transfer 
payments. By contrast, it increases the import burden of medical and essential supplies, thereby 
discouraging the government from taking measures to improve their balance of payments. In a 
similar manner, the log of total cases has a negative impact on other balance of payments 
measures (Column 7). The level of development increases fiscal packages, indicating that 
governments in higher-income economies are more likely to implement larger fiscal expansions.
An increase in healthcare expenditure is also found to have a positive impact on fiscal policy 
packages (Column 1) but a negative impact on monetary expansions (Column 5) and other balance 
of payments measures (Column 7). The positive and negative effects of healthcare expenditure on 
fiscal packages and other monetary expansions represent the government’s focus on improving the 
delivery of services (healthcare and otherwise) and the welfare of the general public, on average. 
An increase in healthcare expenditure involves easing the importation of critical medical supplies, 
thereby reducing the government’s scope for implementing policies aimed at improving the 
balance of payments.
Looking at the vital statistics, we find the number of observations in all seven models is 78. 
The adjusted R-squared values demonstrate explanatory powers between 94.6% (Column 5) and 
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however, the adjusted R-squared value is negative, indicating that a horizontal line has better 
explanatory power than its estimates. The F-statistic rejects the null hypothesis of joint 
insignificance of the coefficients in six of the estimated models. The test for error variance finds 
the estimates from all seven columns to exhibit homoskedasticity. As such, except for Column (6), 
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Table 4 reports results from the quantile regression analysis, excluding the stringency index. 
The regressions are estimated for a total of nine quantiles at regular 10-percentile intervals. The 
coefficient of the stock fall × log of real GDP per capita interaction term is positive across all but 
statistically significant in five quantiles: at the 20th, 40th, and between the 70th and 90th percentiles. 
In addition, stock fall is negative for all quantiles but significant in six: between the 20th and 40th 
and between the 70th and 90th percentiles. The marginal effect of a stock fall is negative in four 
quantiles: at the 20th, 40th, and between the 70th and 80th percentiles. The magnitudes of these are 
smaller in the lower two quantiles than in the upper two. By contrast, the marginal effect of a stock 
fall is positive in the 90th percentile, with values of some 0.78 and 0.77 at the mean and the median 
of the log of real GDP per capita, respectively, greater than the four negative marginal effects 
combined. The quantile estimates also corroborate the OLS finding that a stock fall motivates the 
government to undertake a larger stimulus package in higher-income and more developed 
economies. 
The budget balance is seen to improve the CESI in one quantile—at the 60th percentile—and 
is similar to that of Column (2) in Table 2. The coefficient of the log of the median age is negative 
in the lower eight quantiles and positive in the upper tail quantile. The negative coefficients in the 
lower tail quantiles—between the 20th and 50th percentiles—are statistically significant. This is 
similar to Columns (6) and (7) in Table 2. In the second-lowest quantile, the log of the total 
number of cases is also found to increase the size of the pandemic economic stimulus.
Like in Table 2, the coefficient of healthcare expenditure is positive in all nine quantiles but 
significant in only three: between the 20th and 40th percentiles. This indicates that increasing 
healthcare expenditure (as a share of GDP) increases the COVID-19 economic stimulus index in 
the lower tail of the distribution—especially in lower-income and developing countries. Finally, a 
higher economic growth forecast is found to increase the size of the COVID-19 economic stimulus 
in the lower six quantiles, indicating that higher economic and/or human development usually 
precludes the need for stimulus, bailouts, and other types of transfer programs.
In terms of the vital statistics, we find that the pseudo-R-squared value is low in the lower 
tail and that it increases as we move to the upper tail of the distribution. The explanatory power 
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the quantile estimation process are low—between 0.081 and 0.227—and demonstrate that the 
kernel density functions were not over smoothed, and that the data fit the distributions.
5 Concluding Comments
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to damage the global economy. To dilute its adverse 
economic impact, many countries worldwide have announced stimulus packages. Against this 
backdrop, this paper assesses the responsiveness of monetary and fiscal policy to dramatic changes 
in the stock market resulting from the pandemic. Our results indicate one of the driving factors for 
determining economic stimulus packages is stock market dips in response to COVID-19. 
However, this result is mainly driven by the level of development. Richer countries tend to 
respond more aggressively. In particular, we find the marginal effect of a stock fall on a stimulus 
package is positive and statistically significant for countries having incomes per capita higher than 
the mean/median income per capita. Moreover, we find the monetary policy to be relatively more 
responsive to a fall in stock prices compared to fiscal policy or balance of payments measures.
Our results demonstrate governments’ responses are not only driven by the extent of the 
health shock but also the extent of the economic and financial shock. Asset markets and, 
specifically, stock markets react immediately to any negative or positive news regarding future 
economic activity. We provide evidence that governments around the world responded to a steep 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Low-Income and Lower-
Middle Income
Upper-Middle Income High-Income
Total cases 136.324 3289.207 8177.732
(250.496) (15071.539) (20227.776)
Median Age 22.611 31.655 39.056
(4.976) (6.166) (6.405)
Real GDP per capita (US$, thousands) 1563.283 7050.117 37855.566
(1021.355) (2426.008) (20876.411)
Health expenditure (% of GDP) 5.504 6.446 7.675
(1.925) (2.400) (2.443)
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people) 1.069 3.521 4.383
(1.091) (2.295) (2.484)
Infection rate (%) 6.56e-06 0.0000415 0.000517
(0.0000133) (0.0000487) (0.000749)
Stock market change (%) -0.327 -0.316 -0.326
(0.153) (0.164) (0.126)
Budget balance (% of GDP) -2.089 -2.685 -2.984
(2.989) (8.780) (2.843)
Real GDP growth rate (%; forecast) -0.518 -3.819 -5.138
(2.738) (2.818) (3.159)
World uncertainty index (2019Q4) 0.085 0.080 0.109
(0.086) (0.070) (0.082)
CESI -0.662 -0.619 0.789
(0.526) (0.739) (1.409)
Stock fall (<–1 S.D.) 0.833 0.828 0.938
(0.378) (0.384) (0.245)
Stock rise (>+1 S.D.) 0.000 0.034 0.000
(0.000) (0.186) (0.000)
Observations 36 29 48
Note:
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Table 2: Pandemic stimulus models, OLS estimates
Panel A: Regression estimates
Dependent variable: CESI
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Stock fall (<–1 S.D.) × Log of real GDP per capita 
(US$, thousands)
0.599*** 0.512** 0.542*** 0.532*** 0.534*** 0.511***
(0.168) (0.238) (0.167) (0.167) (0.168) (0.165)
Stock rise (>+1 S.D.) × Log of real GDP per capita 
(US$, thousands)
-0.221* -0.363*** -0.247** -0.219* -0.237* -0.252**
(0.121) (0.113) (0.119) (0.120) (0.121) (0.115)
Stock fall (<–1 S.D.) -5.170*** -4.908** -4.701*** -4.653*** -4.673*** -4.542***
(1.439) (2.141) (1.427) (1.429) (1.431) (1.416)
Stock rise (>+1 S.D.) - - - - - -
Stock market change (%) 6.547*
(3.851)
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(0.448)
Budget balance (% of GDP) 0.00417 0.0544** 0.00401 -0.000518 0.00493 0.0117 0.00322
(0.0192) (0.0255) (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0199)
Log of median age -0.119 -0.789 -0.237 -0.369 -0.438 -1.034* -1.412**
(0.533) (0.748) (0.525) (0.528) (0.533) (0.552) (0.557)
Log of hospital beds (per capita) -0.108 -0.0164 -0.138 -0.155 -0.164 -0.0348 0.112
(0.163) (0.246) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.163) (0.174)
Infection rate (%) 430.2* 180.4 338.3 335.9 313.7 300.3 485.4
(220.6) (256.3) (220.3) (220.3) (221.1) (454.8) (498.0)
Log of real GDP per capita (US$, thousands) 0.0445 0.411 0.0319 0.0427 0.0888 0.256 0.384*
(0.215) (0.297) (0.211) (0.210) (0.213) (0.216) (0.209)
Stringency index -0.00466
(0.00477)
Log of total cases 0.110** 0.0872 0.0853 0.0248 0.0281
(0.0508) (0.0527) (0.0530) (0.0655) (0.0715)
Health expenditure (% of GDP) 0.0752 0.0579 0.117* 0.128*
(0.0479) (0.0501) (0.0612) (0.0657)
Real GDP growth rate (%; forecast) -0.000105 0.125* 0.109
(0.0111) (0.0705) (0.0777)
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(1.257) (1.382)
Panel B: Model vital statistics
Observations 96 43 96 95 94 78 78






























Panel A: S.D. stands for Standard Deviation. Parentheses contain standard errors. ***, **, & * denote statistically significant coefficient at the 1, 5, & 10 percent levels of 
significance (α).
Panel B: Parentheses contain p-values. Null hypotheses: a Coefficients are jointly insignificant, & b Residuals are homoscedastic. *** denotes rejection of the respective null 
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Table 3: Pandemic stimulus model estimates, disaggregating the CESI



















Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Stock fall (<–1 S.D.) × Log of 
real GDP per capita (US$, 
thousands)
0.510 2.039 15.22*** 1.172 -0.0214 -0.0553 -0.0438
(0.686) (5.346) (5.335) (0.814) (0.0437) (0.220) (0.0813)
Stock rise (>+1 S.D.) × Log of 
real GDP per capita (US$, 
thousands)
-0.521 -4.090 -0.787 -0.258 -0.119*** -0.0273 -0.0607
(0.477) (3.713) (3.705) (0.565) (0.0304) (0.153) (0.0565)
Stock fall (<–1 S.D.) -5.837 -20.51 -126.9*** -10.49 0.111 0.619 0.236
(5.874) (45.75) (45.65) (6.968) (0.374) (1.887) (0.696)
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Budget balance (% of GDP) 0.0284 0.240 -0.234 0.0632 -0.00124 0.00247 -0.00704
(0.0806) (0.628) (0.626) (0.0956) (0.00513) (0.0259) (0.00955)
Log of median age -4.359* -19.82 3.596 -1.587 0.295** -0.0284 0.425
(2.289) (17.83) (17.79) (2.715) (0.146) (0.735) (0.271)
Log of hospital beds (per capita) 1.032 -8.437 -6.920 0.364 -0.0431 0.114 -0.00905
(0.678) (5.282) (5.271) (0.804) (0.0432) (0.218) (0.0804)
Infection rate (%) 3,763* -23,443 -6,737 1,377 -107.8 -359.4 -462.3**
(1,887) (14,697) (14,665) (2,238) (120.2) (606.2) (223.6)
Log of real GDP per capita (US$, 
thousands)
1.575* 9.729 -0.730 0.182 0.0221 -0.0120 -0.110
(0.895) (6.972) (6.956) (1.062) (0.0570) (0.288) (0.106)
Log of total cases -0.0842 1.554 -2.116 0.425 0.0226 0.0477 0.0893***
(0.272) (2.118) (2.114) (0.323) (0.0173) (0.0874) (0.0322)
Health expenditure (% of GDP) 0.688*** 0.00999 1.365 0.363 -0.0307* -0.00890 -0.0537*
(0.254) (1.976) (1.972) (0.301) (0.0162) (0.0815) (0.0301)
Real GDP growth rate (%; 
forecast)
0.468 0.677 3.094 0.386 -0.0173 0.0152 -0.0311
(0.292) (2.278) (2.273) (0.347) (0.0186) (0.0939) (0.0347)
World uncertainty index 
(2019Q4)










This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
(5.216) (40.63) (40.54) (6.187) (0.332) (1.676) (0.618)
Panel B: Model vital statistics
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78






























Panel A: B.o.P. and S.D. stand for Balance of Payments and Standard Deviation, respectively. Parentheses contain standard errors. ***, **, & * denote statistically significant 
coefficient at the 1, 5, & 10 percent levels of significance (α).
Panel B: Parentheses contain p-values. Null hypotheses: a Coefficients are jointly insignificant, & b Residuals are homoscedastic. *** denotes rejection of the respective null 
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Table 4: Pandemic stimulus model, quantile regression estimates
Panel A: Regression estimates
Dependent variable: CESI
Quantile, (𝜏) = ?
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)




























































Stock rise (>+1 S.D.) - - - - - - - - -
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Panel B: Model vital statistics
Pseudo R-squared 0.314 0.278 0.313 0.351 0.386 0.429 0.458 0.470 0.521
Bandwidth 0.081 0.134 0.179 0.214 0.227 0.214 0.179 0.134 0.081
Notes:











This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
Figure 1: Marginal effect of Stock fall (<–1 S.D.) on CESI, OLS estimates (Table 2)
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Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
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a. Column (1) b. Column (2)
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c. Column (3) d. Column (4)
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Figure 1: Marginal effect of Stock fall (<–1 S.D.) on CESI, OLS estimates (Table 2)
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g. Column (7) #
Note:
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Appendix A: Countries in the Dataset
Table A1: List of countries in the dataset
Algeria Ethiopia Malaysia Slovenia
Angola Finland Mali South Africa
Argentina France Malta Spain
Australia Germany Mexico Sri Lanka
Austria Ghana Moldova Sudan
Azerbaijan Greece Morocco Sweden
Bangladesh Guinea Mozambique Switzerland
Belarus Haiti Myanmar Tajikistan
Belgium Honduras Nepal Tanzania
Benin Hong Kong Netherlands Thailand
Brazil Hungary New Zealand Timor-Leste
Burkina Faso Iceland Nicaragua Turkey
Cambodia India Niger Uganda
Cameroon Indonesia Nigeria Ukraine
Canada Iran Norway United Arab Emirates
Chad Ireland Oman United Kingdom
Chile Israel Pakistan United States
China Italy Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Colombia Japan Peru Uzbekistan
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Kazakhstan Philippines Vietnam
Congo, Republic of Kenya Poland Yemen
Côte d'Ivoire Korea, Republic of Portugal Zambia
Croatia Kuwait Qatar Zimbabwe
Cyprus Kyrgyzstan Romania
Czech Republic Laos Russia
Denmark Latvia Rwanda
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Egypt Luxembourg Singapore
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Appendix B: Quantile Regression Method
Following Koenker (2005), we explain the concept of a quantile by considering a random 
variable  that has real values for the which the (right-continuous) distribution function is 𝑋
expressed as:
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑋 ≤ 𝑥) (B1)
where, satisfying the bounds , Equation (B2) is defined as the th quantile of .0 < 𝜏 < 1 𝜏 𝑋
𝐹 ―1(𝜏) = inf {𝑥:𝐹(𝑥) ≥ 𝜏} (B2)
For an empirical implementation on a dataset of  observations, the distribution function  is 𝑛 𝐹
replaced by Equation (B3),




𝐼(𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑥) (B3)
Here, the indicator function, , takes the value of one (1) if a particular argument (defined 𝐼
arbitrarily by the researcher) is true and zero (0) otherwise. The empirical interval of solutions for 
th quantile of  is given as:𝜏 𝑋
𝐹 ―1𝑛 (𝜏) = inf {𝑥:𝐹𝑛(𝑥) ≥ 𝜏} (B4)
This yields the optimization problem as Equation (B5):
𝐹 ―1𝑛 (𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜉{ ∑
𝑖:𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝜉
𝜏|𝑋𝑖 ― 𝜉| + ∑
𝑖:𝑋𝑖 < 𝜉





where,  and  represent the piecewise linear loss function that puts asymmetric weight 𝜉 ∈ 𝐑 𝜌𝜏(𝑢)
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𝜌𝜏(𝑢) = 𝑢(𝜏 ― 𝐼(𝑢 < 0)) (B6)
The solution to the optimization problem in Equation (B5) is the quantile of . This solution 𝑋
can be applied to a general procedure regressing conditional quantile functions. Consider  as a 𝑦
function of vector  containing  number of regressors. The conditional quantile function for the 𝑧 𝑝 𝜏
th quantile under a regression framework is given by:
𝑄𝑦(𝜏|𝑧) = 𝑧⊤𝑖 𝛽(𝜏) (B7)
Estimating the empirical quantile regression requires solving (minimizing) the unconditional 
quantile Equation (B8),
𝛽𝑛(𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛




𝜌𝜏(𝑦𝑖 ― 𝑧⊤𝑖 𝛽(𝜏))} (B8)
This generates , which is a vector of  number of estimated coefficients for the th 𝛽(𝜏) 𝑝 𝜏
conditional quantile. 
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